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This paper posits that deforestation and poverty levels are related through an inverted-U 
shape --the environmental Kuznets-- curve and that access to credit shifts this curve 
downwards, thus positively impacting natural resource uses. This hypothesis is tested 
using a household panel data set from El Salvador.  
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the conditions under which, in developing 
countries, rural household strategies for income generation and consumption smoothing 
may lead to deforestation and to other forms of natural resource degradation, such as soil 
erosion and watershed threats.  Further, the paper examines how access to cost-effective 
financial services (namely, loans) can play a role in the choice of livelihood strategies 
and through these choices have indirect impacts on natural resource uses.  In particular, 
the paper addresses linkages between low living standards in the countryside, limited 
access to markets, and agriculture’s expansion in fragile environments.  The impact of 
access to financial services on the shape of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) for 
land use change is tested empirically using a household panel data set from El Salvador. 
Keywords: Natural resource use, poverty, environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), El 
Salvador, South America.
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The relationship between poverty and environmental degradation in the developing world 
has been a topic of increasing debate and concern. Some posit the existence of a 
downward spiral, through which low living standards contribute to increased pressure on 
natural resources while, in turn, this pressure exacerbates poverty (Grepperud). Others 
claim that environmental damage increases as income does. Still another perspective 
considers the possibility that, when incomes become sufficiently high, pressures on 
natural resources may diminish, as wealthy societies demand more and can better afford 
conservation efforts. An intermediate perspective is the idea that this relationship may be 
outlined as an inverted U, a shape now known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. This 
notion recognizes that income growth may be initially detrimental to natural resource 
conservation but that, after some threshold, income growth becomes environmentally 
beneficial.   
The relationship between income and natural resource uses is influenced by 
different factors, such as levels of education and household access to financial markets, 
particularly credit. In particular, the relationship between access to credit and natural 
resource use has not been explored in depth. This has reflected, in part, the lack of 
household level data that would allow consideration of microeconomic variables. In 
addition, some studies that analyze this relationship have generated ambiguous results. 
On the one hand, in theory, it is expected that credit would reduce deforestation if it were 2  
used for more intensive agriculture or for investment in forest management. On the other 
hand, access to credit might increase deforestation if used for clearing activities, such as 
increasing the amount of land for pasture. Empirically, both results have been observed, 
with some predominance of studies that support a positive relationship between credit 
availability and deforestation. It becomes clear that additional research must be 
undertaken on this topic, to provide better insights to policymakers.  
This paper seeks answers about the impact of access to credit on natural resource 
use decisions and about how poverty levels shape this relationship. Answering these 
questions can contribute to a better understanding of household decisions on the use of 
credit as a tool for overcoming poverty and of its implications for environmental 
degradation in developing countries. 
The main hypothesis is that the relationship between agricultural land use and the 
income of rural households can be represented by an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) 
and that this curve shifts as a result of access to credit. The expected effects of access to 
credit on the EKC are a reduction in the level of environmental degradation at every level 
of income and a decrease in the threshold at which economic growth begins to be 
environmentally beneficial. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that, with access to 
credit, rural households can gain additional purchasing power over market inputs for their 
agricultural activity –that is, they can engage in a type of agricultural intensification– 
thereby releasing pressure on those natural resources (non-market inputs) available at the 
fringe and used as part of an income-smoothing strategy to deal with adverse shocks. 3  
Another expected response from access to credit is an increased ability to engage in non-
agricultural activities and thus also releasing the pressure on land. 
We use data from El Salvador for the empirical test of these hypotheses. A major 
data gathering effort has been implemented by the Fundación Salvadoreña para el 
Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES) and the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio 
State University (OSU).  Since 1996, a nationally representative sample of rural 
households has been questioned biennially about their economic activities during the 
preceding calendar year.  A panel of household-level data for 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001 
thus became available for empirical investigation. 
Poverty and Natural Resource Use 
To reconcile various perspectives about poverty and environmental degradation, a 
number of economists have posited an EKC, in reflection of the idea that economic 
growth may be initially detrimental for natural resources in developing countries but that, 
after some threshold, economic growth eventually becomes environmentally beneficial. 
In recent years, several authors have investigated specific dimensions of EKCs that 
correspond to various kinds of resource degradation, including agricultural land clearing, 
in different parts of the world (Barbier).  Whether resource degradation is high or low at 
the peak of the curve has much bearing on the environmental consequences of economic 
development.  Similarly important is the income threshold beyond which economic 
growth and environmental quality are not just compatible but are mutually reinforcing.   4  
Cropper and Griffiths, for example, find that the threshold at which the 
relationship between income and deforestation becomes negative is well above GDP per 
capita in the vast majority of African and Latin American countries with extensive tracts 
of tree-covered land.  This finding implies that, ceteris paribus, development in those two 
continents is likely to coincide with widespread loss of natural habitats. Similar findings 
for El Salvador are reported by Rodriguez-Meza, Southgate and Gonzalez-Vega. 
Barbier points out that most attempts to estimate a general EKC for agricultural 
land clearing have met with little success.  In a comprehensive review of 150 empirical 
studies on tropical deforestation, Kaimowitz and Angelsen conclude that exceptions are 
frequent to general claims about the forces driving the loss of tree-covered habitats in the 
tropics.  They report, however, that increases in non-agricultural employment usually 
ease pressure on forests.  Nevertheless, the introduction of improved agricultural 
technology and other aspects of rural development, which are generally reckoned to 
diminish the clearing of natural habitats, do not always have this effect. 
One reason why insights are still lacking about linkages between low standards of 
living and deforestation is that much of the empirical literature consists of cross-country 
studies.  Comparison of average incomes, rates of land-use change, and other national 
aggregates does not allow for a very nuanced examination of the causes of rural poverty, 
why rural households (poor and otherwise) convert forests into agricultural land, and 
related topics.  Better insights are gained by analyzing household-level data. 
Surveys of rural households have been carried out to empirically examine the 
microeconomics of tropical deforestation. Individual choices among farming systems in 5  
northeastern Ecuador were found to be influenced by a diverse set of factors, including 
soil quality, tenure security, market access, and educational attainment of adult members 
of the household (Pichón and Pichón et al.).  Rabindran found that land clearing in the 
Bolivian Amazon is negatively related to educational attainment and off-farm wage labor.  
Zwane used panel data to analyze impacts of income change on deforestation in 
the Peruvian Amazon.  She found that permanent income is not differentially correlated 
with land clearing at the household level, although a household’s size and its access to 
labor markets are.  Zwane concludes that creating opportunities for off-farm employment 
may be the best way to raise living standards while simultaneously conserving forests.  
Southgate also contends that improved opportunities for non-agricultural employment 
reduce pressure on natural habitats, as such options raise the opportunity cost of labor 
needed for land clearing.  Bluffstone, Holden, Ozório de Almeida and Campari, and 
Pichón offer empirical evidence of this linkage. 
Zwane illustrates the insights to be gained from using panel data. Indeed, 
permanent income can be estimated only if panel data are available.  Likewise, 
longitudinal surveying allows for examination of the impacts of positive or negative 
trends or shocks in income.  Panel data analysis of land-use change at the household level 
was undertaken in southwestern Palawan, the Philippines, where part of the sample 
interviewed in 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 comprised farm households in a lowland area.  
The rest of the sample was in an upland area experiencing active deforestation (Shively 
and Martinez).  Increases in the derived demand for labor resulting from a major 
irrigation project in the lowland area were sufficient to drive up the opportunity cost of 6  
labor at higher elevations, which encouraged a switch to farming systems that save labor, 
are more capital-intensive, and reduce agricultural land clearing (Shively). 
Rodriguez-Meza, Southgate, and Gonzalez-Vega estimate a recursive permanent-
income model in order to test the hypothesis of the existence of an EKC for farmed area 
at the household level in El Salvador, using panel data set for 427 households, with four 
biennial observations between 1995 and 2001.  The peak of the EKC plotted with the 
estimated coefficients is at a level of permanent income well above what is earned by the 
vast majority of the households in the sample.  In effect, predicted per capita incomes for 
more than 85 percent of the sample are below the threshold at which improved living 
standards begin to coincide with diminished agricultural land use. This paper builds on 
these findings in exploring the impact of access to credit on the shape of the EKC. 
Rural income growth in El Salvador 
Although rural poverty declined during the 1990s in El Salvador, by the end of the 
century still 59 percent of the rural population were below the relative poverty line and 
31 percent were below the extreme poverty line (Lardé de Palomo). Studies using panel 
household data also revealed wide fluctuations in income and a high degree of mobility 
across the deciles of the income distribution (Beneke de Sanfeliú).   
Indeed, rural households in El Salvador have experienced significant shocks in 
recent years. First, the country has been buffeted by environmental disturbances of great 
magnitude. Drought struck in 1997, when the last El Niño was at its peak. In early 1999, 
Tropical Storm Mitch unleashed torrential rains, which flooded low-lying areas and 7  
destroyed roads and bridges. Dry conditions returned in 2001, a year that began with a 
pair of earthquakes, and the drought-cum-floods continued in 2002. Second, even more 
devastating has been the steep decline in coffee prices. After peaking at $2.00 per pound 
in late 1997, the international price fell to $1.00 in 1999, and then it halved again during 
the following two years (Rodriguez-Meza, Southgate and Gonzalez-Vega). 
Based on data from the panel of rural households, average per capita income for 
2001 was US $788 (Rodriguez-Meza and Gonzalez-Vega).
1  Thus, the average rural 
household in El Salvador was slightly above the threshold of two dollars per day. In 
1999, however, per capita income among these rural households had been US$ 698, 
which is below the poverty line. Lopez, based on the first observation of the panel, found 
that for 1995 per capita income was US$ 460.
2  Thus, per capita incomes increased but 
the data also reflect a high level of income volatility, which implies vulnerability, and the 
absence of tools to smooth income and consumption, with the corresponding negative 
impacts on welfare.   
Land use in El Salvador 
Even though deforestation in El Salvador reached an advanced cumulative stage 
long ago, since the early 1990s agricultural land use has increased at the expense of tree-
covered habitats. According to FAO, forests in El Salvador cover around five percent of 
the total land area. One fourth of the farmland shows a high degree of erosion and loss of 
productivity, and about 70 percent of the population depends on firewood (Panayotou, 
Faris, and Restrepo).  8  
An aspect of land clearing for agricultural purposes in places like El Salvador is 
puzzling at first glance.  With commodity prices falling and crop yields being diminished 
by drought, storms, and earthquakes, one might reasonably expect farmed area to decline 
over time, especially if non-agricultural employment and opportunities for migration 
abroad have been increasing.  However, precisely the opposite has been happening in El 
Salvador (Gonzalez-Vega et al.).  The key to explaining this seeming anomaly is to 
appreciate that, along with purely commercial demands for agricultural land, there exists 
a demand that is best characterized as precautionary. The household’s precautionary 
demand for farmland is especially pronounced in relatively bad times, when survival is 
particularly tenuous and more labor is devoted to subsistence farming. The cultivated 
portion of the household’s landholding then increases.  In contrast, this demand is 
negligible for affluent households, as they usually possess assets and access to markets –a 
credit line, a savings account, assets that can be sold or pawned, family remittances– that 
can be used to maintain consumption in the face of income shortfalls. 
The relationship between income and agricultural land use is the net result of two 
influences.  One relates to a household’s demand for land, which is largely precautionary 
and is a decreasing function of income.  The other has to do with a household’s wealth, 
purchasing power, and access to natural resources and is an increasing function of 
income.  For low levels of income, the first influence dominates, and many households 
are left with an unsatisfied willingness to cultivate more land.  As their income increases, 
their command over resources increases, and additional land is cultivated.  For high 
levels of income, in contrast, the second influence dominates and the declining demand 9  
for cropland is binding. This behavior results in the EKC identified by Rodriguez-Meza, 
Southgate, and Gonzalez-Vega.  If additions to cultivation imply the use of marginal 
lands, normally plots with low fertility and considerable slope and thus susceptible to 
erosion, soil degradation will follow.  
Access to credit in El Salvador 
Rural households demand loans from different sources: (1) private commercial 
banks and other regulated financial intermediaries; (2) development agencies, including 
state-owned organizations whose role is to assist rural households or farmers, as well as 
non-profit (NGO) microfinance organizations and credit and savings cooperatives; (3) 
trade-related sources, including input providers or crop buyers; and (4) individuals, who 
either lend for profit (moneylenders) or because of a personal relationship with the 
household (relatives, friends, bosses, landlords and the like). The first two types are 
considered formal sources, while commercial and individual sources are considered 
informal. 
Formal financial markets in El Salvador are thin and poorly developed, especially 
in the rural areas.  Rodriguez-Meza found that almost two-thirds of the rural households 
in the sample did not have loans of any type.  He also found significant segmentation 
between formal and informal credit markets in El Salvador. 
Private banks and regulated financial intermediaries are less than available for 
rural households. Just around one percent among households in the two lowest quintiles 
of the income distribution has used private banks as a source of credit. Trade-related 10  
sources are also relatively less frequent among low-income households, but their share 
grows steadily as income increases. Development agencies reach 20 percent of the lowest 
income households, and this share increases to 35 percent for the two quintiles with the 
highest incomes. By far, however, informal lenders continue to be the source of loans for 
an important fraction of the rural population. These sources are the most frequently used 
for households in three out of five income quintiles. 
Because households adopt both ex ante and ex post mechanisms to cope with risk, 
observed credit outcomes must be evaluated by simultaneously considering other risk-
management options of the household (Deaton, Morduch).  Among alternative 
mechanisms for coping with adverse shocks, the cultivation of marginal lands appears to 
be particularly costly, in terms of yields and sustainability.  Adoption of this strategy may 
suggest that barriers to access to credit markets exist.  Poor, credit-constrained 
households may thus engage in environmentally adverse risk-management strategies.  
The impact of access to credit on deforestation and other uses of natural resources 
remains indeterminate. In an extensive review of papers related with deforestation, 
Kaimowitz and Angelsen conclude that analytical studies find ambiguous effects of 
access to credit on changes in land use. Empirical studies, in turn, have reported increases 
in deforestation as result of access to credit. These reviewers claim, however, that the 
results are not reliable due to the type of data used.  
The problem may in part be attributed to the way in which access to credit is 
included in the models. In analyzing the potential impact of access to credit on land use 
decisions, special consideration should be given to credit rationing. In rural credit 11  
markets, households are not always granted the amount of credit they demand, even if 
they are willing to pay the going interest rate.  Rationing may in general reflect policy 
and other constraints on the setting of interest rates or the unwillingness of lenders to 
clear credit markets by raising interest rates, in the presence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard.  Moreover, major difficulties for credit transactions to occur emerge from 
the limited and asymmetric information possessed by potential lenders from outside the 
rural areas and incentive and contract enforcement problems when an efficient legal and 
judicial framework does not exist as well as simply from the high transaction costs that 
result from undeveloped physical and institutional infrastructure.   
Analysis of the impact of access to credit on household decisions should 
recognize the disequilibrium that is created in credit markets by these difficulties 
(Freeman et al.).  Survey figures about the incidence of loans seem to suggest that rural 
households in El Salvador are prone to be credit rationed or not to have access to loans at 
costs comparable to those found in other segments of the economy.  Credit is rationed 
mostly by formal sources (commercial banks and development credit agencies). For the 
analysis of credit rationing here, only formal sources are considered. 
To identify the presence of credit rationing, it is not enough to observe the 
presence or absence of loans. Households not using credit may not be rationed, and 
households using it may be rationed. To determine whether households are credit 
constrained, information about their perceptions and actual use of credit sources must be 
combined. 12  
In terms of the actual access to loans, households were surveyed as to whether 
they had asked for credit or not.  Among those that had applied, some obtained a loan and 
others did not.  Rejected applicants are considered to have been credit rationed, although 
no information is available about their true creditworthiness. Those that did obtain a loan 
but received less than the amount they had asked for are also considered as credit 
rationed. Those that asked for a loan, obtained it, and received what they asked for (or 
more) are considered non-credit rationed. 
In turn, households that did not apply for loans are not necessarily rationed. Those 
that did not apply were questioned about the reasons for this decision. The answers can 
be grouped into four categories: 
a.  No need. Some households claimed not to need a loan. They either faced 
few budget restrictions or such low productivity opportunities that they did 
not required additional funds. These households are categorized here as non- 
credit rationed. 
b.  Risk averse. Some households asserted that credit is very risky, that they do 
not like being indebted, or that they feel uncomfortable having debt. 
c.  High cost. In this category fall all the households that considered that loans 
are available, but that the contract terms are not favorable, given their own 
budget and preferences. Contract terms include too high interest rates, short 
terms to maturity terms, too many requirements, and so on.  While these 
households do not truly face non-price rationing, as they simply do not want 
to pay prices that seem too high for them, the unresolved shortcomings of 13  
financial markets in rural areas explain the excessive cost of loan funds and 
excludes them from using credit in order to take advantage of opportunities 
with marginal rates of return equivalent to others being funded elsewhere.  
d.  Self selected out. In this category are included all the households that think 
that even if they applied, they would not obtain a loan, or that lenders are 
not available, as well as other reasons to consider themselves out of the 
credit market a priori. 
All households in the last three categories are considered to be credit rationed.  
Once this classification is applied to the sample, 15 percent of the total number of 
households during 1999 and 19 percent during 2001 are categorized as not rationed.  
These figures show some improvement in the outreach of formal sources of credit. 
Econometric analysis 
The main hypotheses to test with the econometric analysis are that access to 
financial markets shifts the environmental Kuznets curve, not only by lowering the 
threshold at which increases in income reduce the degradation of natural resources, but 
also by shrinking the whole curve, so at every level of wealth environmental degradation 
is less. 
To include the distinction between credit rationed and non-rationed households in 
the analysis, several alternatives have been proposed (see Jabbar, Ehui and 
VonKaufmann, Freeman et al., Lyons, among others). A popular approach is to 
acknowledge the differentiation between credit-constrained and non-constrained 14  
borrowers and use a switching regression model to correct for possible sample selection 
bias, due to unobservable characteristics of the households (Freeman et al., Fuglie and 
Bosch, Feder et al.). 
The switching regression approach uses a probit model in the first stage, to 
determine the probability of a household being credit constrained and establish the 
relationship of this status with socioeconomic and loan terms variables. In the second 
stage, separate regression equations are used to model land use decisions by categories of 
households, conditional on a specified criterion function. 
Following Freeman et al., the credit-constrained condition of a particular 
household is described by an unobservable excess demand for credit, which is postulated 
to be a function of household socioeconomic, income generation, and credit conditions 
variables.  
I* = δ ’Zi + ui      ( 1 )  
The excess demand for credit is not observed but, using the available data, it is 
possible to determine those households whose productive activities are or not constrained 
by credit. Households are credit-constrained if the demand for credit exceeds the supply. 
These functions are used to define a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of one 
if excess demand for credit is positive, and zero otherwise. 
I = 1    if  I* = δ ’Zi + ui>0       
I = 0   otherwise     (2) 
Following Feder et al., the land use decision of the two groups of farmers is 
modeled by using separate regressions for each group.  15  
Y1i = β 1’X1i + u1i if   I=1 
Y2i = β 2’X2i + u2i if   I=0    (3) 
Estimating these models using OLS yields inconsistent estimates of the 
coefficients, because the expected value of the error term conditional on the sample 
selection criterion is non-zero (Maddala). Therefore, following Lee, a two-stage method 
is used to estimate this system of equations. From the first stage, an inverse Mills ratio 
can be obtained for each household constrained or non-constrained.  
   λ 1i = φ (δ ’Zi)/Φ (δ ’Zi) 
   λ 2i = φ (δ ’Zi)/[1-Φ (δ ’Zi)]     ( 4 )  
These terms are included in the specification of the second-stage equations, 
making their new residuals to exhibit zero conditional means.  
Y1i = β 1’X1i + σ 1u λ 1i  + ε 1i if    I=1 
Y2i = β 2’X2i + σ 2u λ 2i  + ε 2i if    I=0   (5) 
In order to account for possible heterogeneity within and between households 
through the longitudinal sample, a random-effects approach is included in the two-stage 
estimations. 
The first stage implies a probit regression of the rationing condition on household 
socioeconomic variables, income generating activities, and credit conditions. The former 
include demographic characteristics, such as gender and age of the household head as 
well as the education of all household members, and variables capturing household 
endowments, such as total available land, numbers in the labor force, and assets owned. 
Overcrowding in the house and distance to paved roads are included to reflect other 16  
dimensions of poverty and isolation from markets. Income generating opportunities are 
captured by the share of the household labor force working off-farm and in 
microenterprises. Credit conditions include a dummy for households receiving formal 
credit and another one for informal credit. 
In stage two, separate regression equations are used to model agricultural land use 
decisions by the households, conditional on a specified criterion function. Here, the 
dependent variable is the area of land devoted to crops. Explanatory variables, along with 
income net of remittances and subsidies, include income diversification options, 
agricultural related decisions, and control variables. Income generation possibilities are 
captured by the shares of the household’s labor force devoted to off-farm employment 
and microenterprise activities and by the receipt of remittances. Agriculture-related 
variables include a dummy for access to technical assistance (to capture the level of the 
technology), total expenditures in agricultural inputs per hectare (fertilizer, chemicals, 
seed, irrigation), in order to capture degrees of intensification, number of crops grown, 
and an index reflecting the slope of the parcels, to capture plot-related characteristics. 
Total available land is used as a control. Finally, loan amounts for the corresponding year 
are also included for both formal and informal sources. 
Empirical results 
Results from the first stage can be observed in Table 1. The table shows that credit 
rationing, as broadly defined here, is a response to both demand-side and supply-side 
circumstances, which result in households having full access to credit or not. Only 17 17  
percent of the households in the sample can be considered to be non-credit constrained, 
as already indicated. Education of the head of the household is a strong determinant of 
rationing. This reflects both a greater ability to take advantage of productive 
opportunities and a potential screening criterion easily observable by lenders. As found in 
Gonzalez-Vega et al., microenterprises generate a pulling force that takes households out 
of poverty and integrates them into markets. This integration includes access to credit 
markets as well.  
Another important feature affecting the rationed condition is the receipt of 
remittances. Households with remittances from abroad are less frequently rationed. 
Remittances seem to complement a demand for formal credit for income smoothing.  
Moreover, households with access to remittances may be more able to fulfill lender 
requirements. The value for ρ  and its significance show that a random-effects approach is 
most suitable for this analysis. 
Coefficient estimates from the second-stage switching regression models for 
cropland are shown in Table 2. The average columns show differences between the two 
categories. In general, non-credit constrained households exhibit higher incomes, more 
educated heads of household, more land, more remittances, have access to less steep 
plots, spent more in agricultural inputs, and use more credit (from both formal and 
informal sources). 
Credit constrained households do exhibit the expected EKC, with significant 
parameters, while this is not the case for credit constrained households. In both cases, 
better-educated household heads tend to reduce the area of land devoted to agriculture.  If 18  
these heads of household are not credit-constrained, cultivated area is more elastic to 
increases in education. Having access to more total land increases the opportunities of 
expanding the agricultural frontier at the farm level for both groups. Credit-constrained 
households, however, are more elastic to increases in available land. The ability to 
participate in off-farm markets and microenterprise activities reduces significantly the 
chances of using land for agricultural purposes. This is a fact found in several studies, 
and it confirms the positive impact of off-farm employment opportunities in reducing 
environmental degradation, especially for the case of credit-constrained households.  
Non-constrained households are more responsive to less steep plots than those 
constrained. This finding, along with results about access to technical assistance, show 
that non-constrained households engage in more intensive agriculture. Having less budget 
restrictions, nevertheless, when exposed to plots of good quality or with access to 
technical assistance, the result is more use of land for the cultivation of crops. This might 
suggest that households with access to modern technology and no credit constrains might 
be driving the pressure for land in El Salvador. Less constrained households are thus 
responsible for most of the pressure on land. This view coincides with the fact that most 
of these households are at the top of the EKC, close to the maximum level where the 
curve turns downwards.  They may be generating, however, strong impacts on the 
environment. 
Finally, in both cases it was observed that access to funds from formal and 
informal sources reduce the pressure on land. This might be either because households 
engage on more intensive production processes or because households ask for credit to 19  
move out of agricultural activities into microenterprises and other non-agricultural 
opportunities. 
Two technical comments about the regressions: The switching model seems to be 
appropriate, as shown by the significance of the inverse mills ratio coefficient in both 
equations. At the same time, the random-effects approach also seems to be adequate for 
this dataset, per the p-values and R
2 observed. 
Conclusions 
Levels, depth, and dispersion of poverty declined in El Salvador in the last decade 
of the century. Inequality, however, persists, and rural households have not fully enjoyed 
all the benefits from economic growth. Growth is enjoyed first by households with better 
endowments, in terms of both human capital and physical wealth. Barriers to the 
exploitation of new opportunities can be overcome through improvements in access to 
markets and human capital formation. 
Given the current structure of income generation in rural El Salvador, it is 
expected that economic growth will exert additional pressure on natural resources, 
especially land. Those households overcoming poverty, creating new income-generating 
opportunities, and gaining access to credit markets are at the same time those creating the 
maximum pressure on land. In a setting where land is extremely scarce and land markets 
are far from perfect, this will be reflected in further environmental degradation. 
Access to credit exerts a positive impact on land conservation, given that 
households that use loans either for intensification of the agricultural process or –more 20  
importantly- for the consolidation of non-agricultural productive opportunities, release 
pressure on marginal lands. 
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Table 1. Rationing condition random effects probit. 
Variable Coefficient  Semielasticity Average 
Head gender  -0.32  -0.27  0.8 
Head education  -0.04**  -0.12**  2.7 
Share of labor force in microent. -0.55**  -0.07**  0.1 
Formal loans amount  -0.05***  -0.07***  1.4 
Informal loans amount  -0.09***  -0.03***  0.4 
Remittances -0.01*  -0.05*  5.3 
Number of crops  -0.03  -0.04  1.4 
Technical assistance  -0.32  -0.02  0.1 
Year 2001  -0.20*  -0.10*  0.5 




Wald chi2(9)  54 
Log likelihood  -362   
*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10% 26  
Table 2. Random effects model for cropland decisions conditional upon credit constrain 
  Credit constrained  Credit non-constrained 
Variable  Coefficient Semi elast Average Coefficient Semi elast  Average
Income  0.03 **  0.25**  6.1  -0.01  -0.06   8.4 
Income squared  -0.00 *  -0.05*  83.2  0.00  0.05   150.9 
Head education  -0.04 ***  -0.17*** 2.5  -0.04*  -0.20 *  3.5 
Total land  0.11 ***  0.30*** 1.8  0.06*** 0.19 ***  2.3 
Share labor force off farm  -0.29 ***  -0.17*** 0.4  0.05  0.03   0.4 
Share labor force micro  -0.90 ***  -0.16*** 0.1  -0.09  -0.02   0.2 
Remittances  -0.01 ***  -0.10*** 5.0  -0.01  -0.05   6.6 
Technical assistance  -0.28 **  -0.02**  0.1  0.31*  0.04 *  0.1 
Terrain slope  0.19 ***  0.53*** 1.8  0.26*** 0.71 ***  2.0 
Inputs cost  -0.03 **  -0.06**  1.2  -0.03  -0.06   1.6 
Formal loans size  -0.06 ***  -0.04*** 0.5  -0.01  -0.12   6.1 
Informal loans size  -0.19 ***  -0.07*** 0.2  -0.04  -0.05   1.0 
Year 2001  -0.26 ***  -0.19*** 0.5  -0.13  -0.09   0.5 
Inverse Mills ratio  15.72 ***  7.85*** 0.3  -2.03*  -3.74 *  1.4 
Constant   -4.49 ***        3.23*       
Rho  0.62          0.84     
Observations 756          153       
R-sq:  within  0.167         0.580       
Between 0.510          0.459       
Overall 0.464          0.487       
*** significant at 1%  ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10% 27  
Footnotes 
                                                 
1 The exchange rate was 8.75 colones per US dollar. All figures are deflated to constant colones of 
1999. Average values are usually inflated by outliers.  In fact, median per capita incomes were US$ 465 
and US$ 547, for 1999 and 2001, respectively. 
2 Lopez indicates that some correction may be needed for the income reported in the surveys. He 
found that, according to the GDP estimates for El Salvador and using information about the rural sector, 
there was under-reporting of about one hundred dollars, which requires a correction of about 22 percent. 
Revised methods for estimating income have reduced the degree of underestimation (Rodriguez-Meza and 
Gonzalez-Vega). 